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CHAPTER 4 
THE AFTER-LIFE OF THE FILM 
 
In the last twenty years, Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) has been used as a reference for students of the 
cold war and critics of U.S. foreign and nuclear policies. Historians have referred to the 
film as a symbolic and significant commentary on the arms race, and, as such, it has 
emerged as an important icon in the culture of the cold war. The meaning of the film for 
journalists and the public has changed over time. During the Reagan administration, 
authors referred to contemporary figures as “Dr. Strangeloves,” suggesting they were 
inclined to wage nuclear war. Journalists also referred to the motion picture when 
identifying an era or a possible scenario in which the threat of nuclear war was high. 
During the presidency of George W. Bush, the film was invoked once again to suggest 
that a president wished to wage nuclear war without any consideration of the dangers 
such action posed to the world. Most recently, critics of Bush’s policy toward Iraq have 
invoked Dr. Strangelove to question the wisdom of the president’s policies. This new Dr. 
Strangelove loved war in general, conventional and nuclear. No other film has left a 
political legacy like Dr. Strangelove. Kubrick’s comedy has become a part of everyday 
discourse about American foreign policy and nuclear strategies.   
Historians have utilized Dr. Strangelove in a variety of ways. The first essays on 
the film by Charles Maland and Lawrence Suid, both scholars of film studies, attempted 
to explain Kubrick’s message and the significance of the film in 1964. Dr. Strangelove 
has since been incorporated into historical studies of the cold war and US foreign policy. 
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Historians have also incorporated the film into their studies of the culture of the cold war. 
Furthermore, the growing practice of employing films in the classroom has included the 
use of Dr. Strangelove in many high school and university courses.  
In We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997), John Lewis Gaddis, an 
eminent historian of U.S. foreign policy and the cold war utilized Dr. Strangelove as a 
metaphor for Soviet and U.S. nuclear strategies. Gaddis argued that politicians were 
forced to appear tough and willing to use nuclear weapons even though such a posture 
could lead to the destruction of civilization. He commented that “the play upon which 
Stanley Kubrick based his film had been running for quite some time.”1 Governments 
continued to develop more destructive weapons, not for their military uses but rather their 
psychological impact on the enemy. Gaddis labeled this policy “Strangelovian,” which he 
defined as the faith that weapons of mass destruction could serve a purpose beyond their 
military uses.2 According to Gaddis, Dr. Strangelove exemplified the madness of the 
nuclear policies employed by the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Cultural historians have analyzed the film to explain its significance in the 
discourse on the cold war. Stephen Whitfield devoted a small portion of his work, The 
Culture of the Cold War (1996), to the motion picture, placing it amidst what he 
perceived as a period of thawing in cold war tensions. The film challenged American 
views of the war on communism. Whitfield argued that the production of Dr. Strangelove 
marked the end of government control over cultural expressions of the cold war. Without 
                                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethink ing Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 258. 
 
2 Gaddis, We Now Know, 231. 
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government support, which had been given to most war films produced during and after 
World War II, Kubrick constructed a realistic, biting story about nuclear war.3  
In a more detailed analysis, Margot Henriksen has argued that Dr. Strangelove 
marked a turning point in the culture of dissent against U.S. nuclear policies. In Dr. 
Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (1997), Henriksen 
maintained that two distinct cultures were created by the development of the atom bomb, 
the culture of conformity and the culture of dissent. According to Henriksen, the culture 
of dissent challenged American dependence upon nuclear weapons, highlighting the 
disorder the bomb created and warning of the destruction it represented. She traced the 
culture of dissent following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, prior to the 
release of Dr. Strangelove, often took indirect forms, illustrating doomed state of the 
world. Cultural expressions of dissent were hindered by the investigations of the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities and rampant patriotism. Dr. Strangelove and Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle (1963) were emblematic of the new openness of the culture of 
dissent following the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis. These crises led 
some Americans to question the handling of the war on communism. Kubrick publicly 
destroyed the myth that America’s security was protected by the government, military, 
and nuclear strategies.4 Henriksen utilized the film as a benchmark in the short history of 
dissent against the bomb and as a label suggesting the film’s impact on subsequent 
cultural expressions in the 1960s. After 1964, the United States became what Henriksen 
                                                                 
3 Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University, 
1996), 218-225. 
 
4 Margot Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), xx, xxiii, xxvi. 
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called “Dr. Strangelove’s America” in which criticism of nuclear policies and their 
effects on the public were criticized and debated without fear of reprieve.5 
Dr. Strangelove has also been used as an educational tool by history professors 
and teachers. A variety of essays and monographs have been published advocating the 
use of films in the classroom, most notably Image as Artifact: The Historical Analysis of 
Film and Television edited by John E. O’Connor.6 The summer 2002 issue of the 
Magazine of History, published by the Organization of American Historians, featured 
essays instructing teachers how to utilize films in the classroom. One article proposed 
that Dr. Strangelove could provide students with a better understanding of the cold war 
and the arms race. 7 By guiding students through Kubrick’s satire, instructors have been 
able to expose students to a memorable criticism of US nuclear policies and images that 
have been associated with specific US military officials and strategists. 
While historians have analyzed the film in conjunction with events surrounding 
the film’s release, journalists have referred to Dr. Strangelove when discussing 
contemporary events and figures. Beginning in the Reagan era, journalists referred to Dr. 
Strangelove to suggest that government leaders wished to wage nuclear war. In 1981, 
Washington Monthly editor Jonathan Alter published an article entitled “Reagan’s Dr. 
Strangelove.” The article made no other mention of the film after the title. Alter referred 
to the film to make a comment about his subject, Richard Pipes, President Ronald 
                                                                 
5 Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America, 309, 369. 
 
6 John E. O’Connor, ed., Image as Artifact: The Historical Analysis of Film and Television (Malabar, 
Florida: R.E. Krieger Publishing Company 1990). 
 
7 J. Vincent Lowery, “Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Teach the Film in the 
Classroom,” OAH Magazine of History (summer 2002): 32-36. 
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Reagan’s senior advisor on Soviet and Eastern European affairs.8 After nearly a decade of 
détente, the Reagan administration sought to “roll back” Soviet influence around the 
world. Reagan operated on the assumption that the relaxation of tensions between the 
Soviet Union and the United States had allowed the Soviets to extend their sphere of 
influence and gain qualitative and quantitative nuclear superiority. He chose to rearm the 
US and increase the size of the nation’s conventional forces in order to force the Soviets 
to negotiate political and military treaties that reduced the Soviets’ international 
influence.9 Alter labeled Pipes a “superhawk” whose advice favored this build-up and an 
armed conflict. He said Pipes lacked evidence pertaining to Soviet conduct. Alter referred 
to the film in order to suggest that Pipes could create a situation similar to the scenario 
depicted in Dr. Strangelove.10 
Journalists have referred to Dr. Strangelove when discussing nuclear strategies to 
convey the possibility of a nuclear apocalypse created by those strategies. Bruce Van 
Voorst’s July 1990 article entitled “America’s Doomsday Machine”, featured in Time 
magazine, suggested that the “spirit of Dr. Strangelove” outlived the cold war. Van 
Voorst revealed that the American Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the list of 
nuclear targets inside the Soviet Union allowed the United States to destroy the Soviet 
Union despite President Bush’s claims about his “peaceful” intentions. The article 
invoked Dr. Strangelove to suggest that President George Bush and the United States 
employed an out-dated and dangerous nuclear strategy. According to Van Voorst, the 
                                                                 
8 Jonathan Alter, “Reagan’s Dr. Strangelove,” Washington Monthly (June 1981). 
 
9 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 122-125. 
 
10 Jonathan Alter, “Reagan’s Dr. Strangelove.”  
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threat of nuclear war and the policy of nuclear annihilation still existed despite the 
collapse of communism in most parts of the world.11 
Similar references to the film appeared in newspapers around the world as Russia 
and the United States negotiated an arms reduction agreement. These references 
suggested that an era of nuclear peril had subsided. Less than a year after Van Voorst’s 
article appeared, the Pentagon proposed changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, including the 
removal of up to 2,000 targets in the Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact countries. 
This plan accompanied proposals to reduce Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals. The Los 
Angeles Times featured this story in an article entitled “Dr. Strangelove Takes a Break.”12 
The newspaper referred to the US nuclear strategy as the creation of Strangelove, or 
rather men who believed in the policy of mutually assured destruction despite its threat to 
the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union and the United States. A year later, the Los 
Angeles Times referred to Dr. Strangelove again. The newspaper published an article 
entitled “Waving Goodby [sic] to Dr. Strangelove,” in which it reported that Soviet 
leader Boris Yeltsin and President George Bush had reached an agreement that would 
reduce American and Soviet nuclear arsenals and alter the types of weapons in the 
remaining stockpiles in order to eliminate the possibility of a first strike.13 The title of the 
article suggested that the superpowers had finally taken steps to eliminate the possibility 
of nuclear war Kubrick had envisioned.  
Even when the threat of nuclear war appeared to have subsided, The Times 
[London] warned in October 1993 that the Soviets had developed an automated missile 
                                                                 
11 Bruce Van Voorst, “America’s Doomsday Machine,” Time, 16 July 1990, 19. 
 
12 “Dr. Strangelove Takes a Break,” Los Angeles Times, 22 April 1991, B4. 
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system. Wolfgang Munchau warned readers that the Soviets’ automated system and its 
fallibility was reminiscent of Kubrick’s doomsday machine.14 His reference to the film 
suggested that the cold war had not necessarily ended with the fall of communism, and 
the world’s fate might still be bleak as long as the United States and Russia constructed 
such deadly weapons. Munchau invoked to Dr. Strangelove to conjure up Kubrick’s 
images of an accidental nuclear war in a world gone mad.   
Without providing readers any details about the film, these articles referred to Dr. 
Strangelove, marking its meaning implicit in the nuclear lexicon. The authors assumed 
that readers were familiar with the film. They referenced the motion picture as if anyone 
interested in the arms race and nuclear strategy remembered and understood Kubrick’s 
message.  
President George W. Bush’s decision to build a large-scale missile defense system 
in 2001 caused some Americans to recall the warnings implied in Dr. Strangelove. They 
drew comparisons between characters’ actions and the current administration’s nuclear 
policies. Abandoning the treaties signed with the Soviet Union, Bush announced his 
intention to protect the United States from foreign threats. President Reagan originally 
proposed that the United States develop a strategic defense system, in violation of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed with the Soviet Union. Reagan claimed that 
the Soviets had violated the ABM Treaty and the United States lacked the necessary 
protection from a Soviet attack. Reagan was responsible for a massive increase in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 “Waving Goodby [sic] to Dr. Strangelove” Los Angeles Times, 18 June 1992, B4. 
 
14 Wolfgang Munchau,” Russia Holds Strangelove Key to Global Obliteration,” The Times , 9 October 
1993, 12. 
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military spending and nuclear arms research and development.15 Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger and scientific advisor Edward Teller, one of the objects of Kubrick’s 
criticism in 1964, supported the plan wholeheartedly, believing that the nation depended 
on SDI in order to survive. Historian Walter LaFeber has suggested that Reagan ignored 
the advice of officials in the Pentagon and scientists who doubted that the system could 
work and warned that SDI would destabilize Soviet-American relations. A missile 
defense system would allow the US to attack the Soviet Union without fear of 
retaliation. 16 President George W. Bush resurrected this defense system in 2001 in order 
to protect the US from foreign and terrorist threats. Critics of Bush’s missile defense 
proposals echoed the arguments made against Reagan’s defense proposals. 
Michael Byers, a professor of international law at Duke University, called Bush’s 
decision the “Return of Dr. Strangelove” in the title of his article on Bush’s missile 
defense plan. Byers contended that Bush’s decision to abandon defense through mutual 
deterrence marked the rebirth of the arms race. The author claimed that the construction 
of a missile defense system would “thrust [the world] back into the 1960s: Dr. 
Strangelove, the Cuban missile crisis, and all.”17 Without referring to the details of the 
film, Byers communicated his belief that Bush would foster insecurity by constructing a 
defense system and could lead the world back to the brink of nuclear war that Stanley 
Kubrick exposed in 1964.  
                                                                 
15 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1990 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 302-
304. 
 
16 LaFeber, 304-305; Hans-Henrik Holm, “Star Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 23 (March 1986): 1-8; 
Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to Defence: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), 95, 97. 
 
17 Michael Byers, “The Return of Dr. Strangelove,” Independent on Sunday, 6 May 2001, 21. 
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Letters to the editors addressed who deserved the moniker “Dr. Strangelove” for 
endangering world peace. In a letter to the editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Christian 
Stolz made a similar observation, suggesting that “Strangelove’s disciples, led by Donald 
Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and George W. Bush” had falsely concluded that the US could 
survive a nuclear attack. Stolz worried that these men would lead the world into the 
scenario Kubrick suggested, “when somebody twitches with a nuclear trigger.”18 Rather 
than referring to Bush as Dr. Strangelove, as some critics had after Bush announced his 
missile defense program, an editorial printed in the Richmond Times-Dispatch suggested 
that Bush’s missile defense plan protected America from “the real, maniacal Dr. 
Strangeloves.”19 This editorial proposed that the men willing to destroy the world 
threatened US security. The debate about the soundness of US nuclear policies that 
surrounded the release of Dr. Strangelove was repeated in 2001, during which time 
journalists and the public argued about who had placed the world in jeopardy. 
Daniel Sneider, national- foreign editor for the San Jose Mercury News warned 
that Bush’s missile plan would resurrect the arms race just as Reagan’s program had in 
the early 1980s. Sneider warned readers that Bush’ s advisors sought to develop new types 
of nuclear weapons and renew testing of those weapons. Advisors at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories called for the development of 
nuclear weapons to deter China and Russia from developing nuclear weapons and defend 
the US against the “Axis of Evil,” Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Sneider warned that the 
                                                                 
18“Letters to the Editor,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 9 May 2001, B6. 
 
19 “America’s Defense,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, 17 May 2001, A14.  
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US planned to fight and win a nuclear war, pursuing the same strategy followed by 
Turgidson and Ripper to the apocalypse.20 
President Bush’s plans for an armed conflict with Iraq caused some critics to 
invoke Dr. Strangelove to warn the public of the possible ramifications of a nuclear strike 
against Iraq. In a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times, Ardis Dahl proposed that 
Dr. Strange love was “alive and living in the White House.” Dahl reacted negatively to 
Bush’s willingness to consider using nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against Iraq. 
Dahl invoked the film to question Bush’s willingness to attack Iraq, marking the growing 
use of the film to include the criticism of warmongering.21  
In January 2003, a play entitled “Dr. Strangelove goes to Iraq: The Madness of 
George Dubya” opened at the London theater Threatro Technis. British playwright Justin 
Butcher applied the premise of Dr. Strangelove to the proposed war on Iraq.  In Butcher’s 
reinterpretation, a crazed US Air Force commander launched a preemptive nuclear strike 
against Iraq, having determined that UN weapons inspectors were “pinko” and 
untrustworthy. Butcher borrowed much of Kubrick’s story, including characters and 
dialogue.22 The retelling of Dr. Strangelove as a contemporary crisis suggests that 
audiences had discovered universal applications for Kubrick’s criticisms of US cold war 
policies. The film was simultaneously applied to American’s expansion of the war on 
terrorism and US nuclear policies. 
Since its release nearly forty years ago, Dr. Strangelove has become a part of the 
language of nuclear debate. The film has enjoyed renewed attention since the Reagan 
                                                                 
20 Daniel Sneider, “Quiet moves toward new weapons, testing and strategy invoke new threats,” San Jose 
Mercury News, 19 June 2001.  
 
21 “Dr. Strangelove Is Living in the White House,” Los Angeles Times , 28 January 2003. 
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administration reinvigorated the cold war and the second Bush administration’s return to 
Reagan-era nuclear policies and Bush’s engagement in war on Iraq. Critics have invoked 
the film to illustrate what they perceive as deadly policy decisions, the same reason why 
Kubrick created Dr. Strangelove. As Butcher’s production suggested, the death of the 
Soviet Union did not diminish the possibility of Kubrick’s scenario and what critics have 
deemed flaws in US foreign policies.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Michael Billington, “Review: Theatre: Dr. Strangelove goes to Iraq: The Madness of George Dubya: 
Theatro Technis, London,” The Guardian, 17 January 2003, 20. 
